In this work we revisit the question of basing cryptography on imperfect randomness. Bosley and Dodis (TCC'07) showed that if a source of randomness R is "good enough" to generate a secret key capable of encrypting k bits, then one can deterministically extract nearly k almost uniform bits from R, suggesting that traditional privacy notions (namely, indistinguishability of encryption) requires an "extractable" source of randomness. Other, even stronger impossibility results are known for achieving privacy under specific "non-extractable" sources of randomness, such as the γ-Santha-Vazirani (SV) source, where each next bit has fresh entropy, but is allowed to have a small bias γ < 1 (possibly depending on prior bits).
Introduction
Most cryptographic algorithms require randomness (for example, to generate their keys, probabilistically encrypt messages, etc.). Usually, one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but in many situations this assumption is problematic, and one has to deal with more realistic, "imperfect" sources of randomness R. Of course, if one can (deterministically) extract nearly perfect randomness from R, then one can easily implement traditional cryptographic schemes with R. Unfortunately, many natural sources are not extractable [SV86, CG88, Zuc96] . The simplest example of such a source is the Santha-Vazirani (SV) source [SV86] , which produces an infinite sequence of (possibly correlated) bits x = x 1 , x 2 , . . ., with the property that Pr[x i = 0 | x 1 . . . x i−1 ] ∈ [ 1 2 (1 − γ), 1 2 (1 + γ)], for any setting of the prior bits x 1 . . . x i−1 . Namely, each bit has almost one bit of fresh entropy, but can have a small bias γ < 1 (possibly dependent on the prior bits). Yet, the result of Santha and Vazirani [SV86] showed that there exists no deterministic extractor Ext : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} capable of extracting even a single bit of bias strictly less than γ from the γ-SV source, irrespective of how many SV bits x 1 . . . x n it is willing to wait for. In particular, outputting the first bit is already optimal in terms of traditional extraction.
Despite this pessimistic result, ruling out the "black-box compiler" from perfect to imperfect (e.g., SV) randomness for all applications, one may still hope that specific "non-extractable" sources, such as SV-sources, might be sufficient for concrete applications, such as simulating probabilistic algorithms or cryptography. Indeed, a series of results [VV85, SV86, CG88, Zuc96, ACRT99] showed that very "weak" sources (including SV-sources and much more) are sufficient for simulating probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms; namely, for problems which do not inherently need randomness, but which could potentially be sped up using randomization. Moreover, even in the area of cryptography -where randomness is essential (e.g., for key generation) -it turns out that many "non-extractable" sources (again, including SV sources and more) are sufficient for authentication applications, such as the designs of MACs [MW97, DKRS06] and even signature schemes [DOPS04] (under appropriate hardness assumptions). Intuitively, the reason for the latter "success story" is that authentication applications only require that it is hard for the attacker to completely guess (i.e., "forge") some long string, so having (min-)entropy in our source R should be sufficient to achieve this goal.
Privacy with Imperfect Randomness? In contrast, the situation appears to be much less bright when dealing with privacy applications, such as encryption, commitment, zero-knowledge, etc. First, McInnes and Pinkas [MP90] showed that unconditionally secure symmetric encryption cannot be based on SV sources, even if one is restricted to encrypting a single bit. This result was subsequently strengthened by Dodis et al. [DOPS04] , who showed that SV sources are not sufficient for building even computationally secure encryption (again, even of a single bit), and, if fact, essentially any other cryptographic task involving "privacy" (e.g., commitment, zero-knowledge, secret sharing, etc.). Finally, Bosley and Dodis [BD07] showed an even more general result: if a source of randomness R is "good enough" to generate a secret key capable of encrypting k bits, then one can deterministically extract nearly k almost uniform bits from R, suggesting that traditional privacy requires an "extractable" source of randomness. 1 In this work we ask the question if similar pessimistic conclusions also hold for a more recent, but already very influential variant of privacy called differential privacy (DP), introduced by Dwork et al. [DMNS06] , concentrating in particular on achieving differential privacy with the simple SanthaVazirani source. Main Question: Is it possible to achieve (non-trivial) differential privacy with SV-sources?
Additive-Noise Mechanisms. The simplest class of accurate and private mechanisms (with perfect randomness) are the so called additive-noise mechanisms [DMNS06, GRS09, HT10] , introduced in the original work of [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06] . These mechanisms have the form M (D; r) = f (D) + X(r), where X is an appropriately chosen "noise" distribution added to guarantee ε-DP. For example, for counting queries (and more general "low-sensitivity" queries where |f (D 1 ) − f (D 2 )| is bounded on all neighboring databases D 1 and D 2 ), the right distribution is the Laplace distribution with standard deviation Θ(1/ε) [DMNS06] , giving the (additive-noise) Laplace mechanism for such functions, which is private and accurate (in fact, essentially optimal for a wide range of loss functions [GRS09] ). One perceived advantage of additive-noise mechanisms comes from the fact that the noise is oblivious to the input, and it is natural to ask if it is possible to design additive-noise mechanisms which would be accurate and private even if the noise distribution is generated using the Santha-Vazirani source. For example, perhaps one can generate a "good enough" sample of the Laplace distribution even with SV sources? Unfortunately, we show that this is not the case. In fact, any accurate and private additive-noise mechanism for a source R implies the existence of a randomness extractor for R, essentially collapsing the notion of differential privacy to that of traditional privacy, and showing the impossibility of accurate and private additive-noise mechanisms for SV sources.
Need for Consistent Sampling. In fact, the main reason why additive-noise mechanisms fail to handle SV sources comes from the fact that such algorithms use disjoint sets of coins to produce the same "noisy answer" on two databases having different "real answers". More formally, if f (D 1 ) = f (D 2 ) and T i (z) is the set of coins r where M (D i ; r) = z, an additive-noise mechanism must satisfy T 1 (z) ∩ T 2 (z) = ∅. On the other hand, ε-DP requires that Pr[r ∈ T 1 (z)]/ Pr[r ∈ T 2 (z)] ≤ 1 + ε. For the uniform distribution, this simply means that |T 1 | ≈ |T 2 |. Since T 1 and T 2 are disjoint, the SV adversary can try to bias the coins r so as simultaneously increase (or, at least maintain) the odds of hitting T 1 , while decreasing the odds of hitting T 2 . Indeed, in Lemma 2.4 we show that an SV adversary can always succeed in amplifying the ratio Pr[r ∈ T 1 ]/ Pr[r ∈ T 2 ] (and, hence, violate the differential privacy of our mechanism) whenever T 1 and T 2 have small intersection (e.g., are disjoint).
In fact, in Lemma 3.2 we prove that any "SV-robust" mechanism should strive to produce identical outputs on neighboring databases for a majority of random tapes; in particular, for any z, |T 1 (z) ∩ T 2 (z)| ≈ |T 1 (z)| ≈ |T 2 (z)| (see Definition 4.1 for the exact quantitative formulation). This general property, which we call consistent sampling (CS), is closely related to the "consistent sampling" methodology that has found applications in web search [BGMZ97] and parallel repetition theorems [Hol07] , among others. Moreover, we show that ε-consistent sampling implies ε-differential privacy, but the converse is false.
Our Main Result. The lower bound above suggests a path forward toward building SV-robust mechanisms, which starts with the design of consistently samplable mechanisms. For example, the classical Laplace mechanism for low sensitivity functions could be viewed as sampling some noise x of expected magnitude ρ = O(1/ε), and adding it to the exact solution y = f (D). Being additivenoise, this mechanism is not CS. But, imagine a new mechanism which further rounds the answer z = y + x to the nearest multiple z ′ of 1/ε. Clearly, the expected utility has gone from ρ to at most ρ ′ = ρ + 1/ε = O(ρ). Yet, it turns out that the new mechanism is now ε-CS, since, informally, the rounded answers on neighboring databases are only distinct on an ε-fraction of coins r (see Section 5).
Still, designing CS mechanisms was only a necessary condition for building SV-robust, differentially private mechanisms. For example, the basic notion of consistency ignores the binary representations of random coins r defining the needed pre-image sets T 1 and T 2 , which are (intuitively) very important for handling SV sources since their randomness properties are bit-by-bit. Indeed, we show that consistency alone is not enough for SV-robustness, and we need an additional (fortunately, simply stated) property of our sampling to guarantee the latter. (As expected, this property asks something quite natural about the binary representations of the coins inside T 1 and T 2 .) We call the resulting notion SV-consistent sampling (SVCS; Definition 4.3). Building an accurate and private mechanism satisfying this condition formed the main technical bulk of our work.
In particular, starting with the "rounded" Laplace mechanism, we show a careful implementation of this CS mechanism, so that the resulting mechanism is actually SVCS (with appropriate parameters guaranteeing ε-DP of the final mechanism against γ-SV sources). The details of this technical step, which uses properties of arithmetic coding (see [MNW98, WNC87] ) applied to the specific Laplace distribution, are explained in Section 5. This gives us our main result (Theorem 5.3) and an affirmative answer to our Main Question: an accurate and private class of SV-robust mechanisms for counting queries and arbitrary low-sensitivity functions.
To maintain a clear presentation, we defer more technical proofs to Appendix A.
Random Sources and Differential Privacy
Notation. For a positive integer n, we use the notation [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use ⌊·⌉ to denote the nearest integer function. For a distribution or random variable R, we write r ← R to denote the operation of sampling a random r according to R. For a randomized function h, we write h(x ; r) to denote the unique output of f on input x with random coins r. When the distribution of random coins R is understood from context, we write h(x) to denote the random variable h(x ; r) for r ← R. Finally, we denote a sequence of bits using boldface, e.g. x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . We use calligraphic letters to denote families of the corresponding letter. For example, F denotes a family of functions f , R denotes a family of distributions R. We see a distribution over {0, 1} * as continuously outputting (possibly correlated) bits. In particular, we let U be the distribution over {0, 1} * that samples each bit independently and uniformly at random. When U is truncated after n bits, the result is the distribution U n , which is the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n , the bit-strings of length n.
Random Sources
We call a family R of distributions over {0, 1} * a source. In this work, we model perfect randomness with the uniform source and imperfect randomness with the γ-Santha-Vazirani source [SV86] , arguably the simplest type of a "non-extractable" source. The uniform source U def = {U} is the set containing only the distribution U on {0, 1} * that samples each bit uniformly at random. We define γ-SanthaVazirani sources below.
We define the γ-Santha-Vazirani source SV(γ) to be the set of all γ-Santha-Vazirani distributions. Finally, for a distribution SV(γ) ∈ SV(γ), we let SV(γ, n) be the distribution SV(γ) restricted to the first n coins (X 1 , . . . , X n ). We let SV(γ, n) be the set of all distributions SV(γ, n).
We now define γ-biased semi-flat sources, which were introduced by [RVW04] (see also [DOPS04] , where they were referred to as γ-biased halfspace sources).
We define the γ-biased semi-flat source H(γ, n) to be the set of all distributions H S (γ, n) for all |S| = 2 n−1 .
We prove a general lemma about γ-semi-flat sources, which will be very useful in later sections. 
We consider two cases: 1. α ≤ 2 n−1 , and 2. α > 2 n−1
Case 1: First suppose that α ≤ 2 n−1 , which means also β ≤ 2 n−1 since we assume |G| ≥ |B|. Then pick any S ⊂ {0, 1} n of size |S| = 2 n−1 such that G ′ ⊆ S and
where
We have,
Then, plugging in this value of ∆ in (2.1), we have
where the last inequality follows from σ < 1.
Case 2: Now assume that α > 2 n−1 . Then pick any S ⊂ {0, 1} n of size |S| = 2 n−1 such that
Differential Privacy and Utility
We start by briefly recalling the notion of differential privacy. Given a database containing confidential information, we wish to allow learning of statistical information about the contents of the database without violating the privacy of any of its individual entries. The standard cryptographic notion of privacy where negligible information is revealed, is not appropriate in this setting as it does not allow to learn even one bit of "global" information about the contents of the database. Therefore, a new privacy definition is needed for this setting, in particular, one that allows a better trade-off between privacy and utility. This is precisely what differential privacy achieves.
The Model. We model a statistical database as an array of rows from some countable set, and say that two databases are neighboring if they differ in exactly one row. Throughout the paper, we let D be the space of all databases. We consider the interactive setting, in which interested parties submit queries, modeled as functions f : D → Z, where Z is a specified range. In this paper, we are only concerned with queries with range Z = Z, and henceforth only consider this case. A mechanism M is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a database D ∈ D and a query f : D → Z, and outputs a value z ∈ Z. We assume that M 's random tape is in {0, 1} * , that is, that M has at its disposal a possibly infinite number of random bits, but for a fixed outcome z ∈ Z, M needs only a finite number of coins n = n(D, f, z) to determine whether M (D, f ) = z. Furthermore, we assume that if r ∈ {0, 1} n is a prefix of r ′ ∈ {0, 1} n ′ and M (D, f ; r) = z is already determined from r, then M (D, f ; r ′ ) = z also. In other words, providing M with extra coins does not change its output.
Definitions. Informally, we wish z = M (D, f ) to approximate the true answer f (D) without revealing too much information. We say a mechanism is differentially private for a class F of queries if for all queries f ∈ F, replacing a real entry in the database with one containing fake information only changes the output distribution of the mechanism by a small amount. In other words, evaluating the mechanism on the same query f ∈ F, on two neighboring databases, does not change the outcome distribution by much. On the other hand, we define its utility to be the expected difference between the true answer f (D) and the output of the mechanism. Since the purpose of this work is to analyze mechanisms with respect to their sources of randomness, the following definitions of privacy and utility explicitly take the source of randomness R into account. Definition 2.5 ((ε, R)-Differential Privacy). Let ε ≥ 0, R be a source, and
of neighboring databases, all f ∈ F, all possible outputs z ∈ Z of M , and all R ∈ R:
This is a very strong definition. Not only does it give a statistical guarantee, making it independent of the computation power of any adversary, but it is also strictly stronger than the requirement that the statistical distance between M (D 1 , f ) and M (D 2 , f ) is at most ε (for example, the latter allows some low-probability outcomes of M (D 1 , f ) to never occur under M (D 2 , f )). We also note that, traditionally, differential privacy has been defined by having the ratio of probabilities be bounded by e ε . We instead bound it by 1+ε, since this formulation makes some of our calculations slightly cleaner. This is fine since we always have 1 + ε ≤ e ε , and, when ε ∈ [0, 1] (which is the main range of interest), we anyway have e ε ≈ 1 + ε.
If a mechanism M is (ε, R)-differentially private for some randomness source R, then a mechanism M ′ that runs M as a black box and then performs some post-processing on the output, is also (ε, R)-differentially private. Intuitively, this is because given only z = M (D, f ), M ′ cannot reveal more information about D than z itself. In our work we only consider the case where M ′ evaluates a deterministic function h of z = M (D, f ), so that M and h do not have to "share" the random source R. Lemma 2.6. Let M be a (ε, R)-differentially private mechanism, and let h be any function. Define
Definition 2.7 ((ρ, R)-Utility). Let ρ > 0, let R be a source, and let F = {f : D → Z} be a class of functions. We say a mechanism M has (ρ, R)-utility for F if for all databases D ∈ D, all queries f ∈ F, and all distributions R ∈ R,
For example, in the case where F is the class of counting queries, where f ∈ F is the number of records in D satisfying some predicate π, we seek to achieve utility ρ = o(|D|) or even independent of |D|.
At the extremes, a mechanism that always outputs 0 is (0, R)-differentially private, while a mechanism that outputs the true answer f (D) has (0, R)-utility. Neither of these mechanisms is very interesting-the first gives no utility, while the second provides no privacy. Instead, we wish to find mechanisms that achieve a good trade-off between privacy and utility. This motivates the following definition. Definition 2.8 (Accurate and Private Mechanisms). We say a function family F admits accurate and private mechanisms w.r.t. R if there exists a function g(·) such that for all ε > 0 there exists a mechanism M ε that is (ε, R)-differentially private and has (g(ε), R)-utility. We call M = {M ε } a class of accurate and private mechanisms for F w.r.t. R.
We make a few remarks regarding this definition. First, we require that the utility ρ = g(ε) is independent of |D|. Second, we note that satisfying this definition implies that we can achieve (ε, R)-differential privacy for any ε > 0 (possibly at the expense of utility). E.g., when R = SV(γ), we should be able to achieve ε ≪ γ, which is below the "extraction barrier" for SV-sources. Finally, we note that for the purpose of satisfying this definition, we can assume w.l.o.g. that ε ≤ 1, which is anyway the case of most interest. Moreover, we can assume that 1/ε is an integer, since otherwise we can simply take a slightly smaller ε for which this is the case.
Infinite-Precision Mechanisms. As we will see shortly, it is sometimes easier to describe mechanisms using samples from some continuous random variable X, instead of using a (discrete) random tape in {0, 1} * . Moreover, the notions of privacy and utility definitions can be analogously defined for this case as well (which we omit for brevity). Of course, to actually "implement" such abstract mechanisms in practice, one must specify how to approximate them using a "finite precision" random tape in {0, 1} * , without significantly affecting their privacy and/or utility. When perfect randomness U is available, this is typically quite easy (and usually not spelled out in most differential privacy papers), by simply approximating a continuous sample from X within some "good enough" finite precision. In contrast, our mechanisms will have to deal with imperfect randomness SV(γ), so rounding a given "continuous" mechanism into a "discrete" mechanism will be non-trivial and require utmost care. In particular, we will have to design quite special "infinite-precision" mechanisms which will be "SV-friendly" toward appropriate "finite-precision rounding".
Additive Noise Mechanisms. One type of accurate and private mechanisms follow the following blueprint: first, they sample data-independent noise x from some (discrete or continuous) distribution X, calculate the true answer f (D), and output z = f (D) + x. We call such mechanisms, additive-noise mechanisms (examples of additive-noises mechanisms include the Laplacian mechanism [DMNS06] , the geometric mechanism [GRS09] , and the K-norm mechanism for multiple linear queries [HT10] ). If E[|X|] is bounded, then the mechanism has good utility. However, to argue that such bounded "noise" X is sufficient to ensure the differential privacy of such mechanisms, we must first restrict our query class F. In particular, it turns out that additive-noise mechanisms achieve differential privacy for a pretty large class of useful functions, called bounded sensitivity functions.
Definition 2.9 (Sensitivity). For f : D → Z, the sensitivity of f is defined as As an example, counting queries are in F 1 . Intuitively, low sensitivity functions do not change too much on neighboring databases, which suggests that relatively small noise can "mask" the difference between f (D 1 ) and f (D 2 ). The particular (continuous) distribution turns out to be the Laplacian distribution, defined below. In particular, for any sensitivity bound d, Dwork et al. [DMNS06] showed the following class of (infinite-precision) additive-noise mechanisms M Lap = {M Lap ε } is accurate and private for F d . Given a database D ∈ D, a query f ∈ F d and the target value of ε, the mechanism M Lap ε computes f (D) and adds noise from the Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation (
Equivalently, we can also view this mechanism as computing y = f (D) and outputting a sample from the distribution Lap y,d/ε . Moreover, it is easy to see that this infiniteprecision mechanism achieves O(d/ε)-utility.
In order to ensure that the output of the mechanism of [DMNS06] is an integer, the result can be rounded to the nearest integer. Since this is post-processing, by Lemma 2.6, the result has the same privacy guarantees. Furthermore, since f (D) ∈ Z, we have ⌊f
In particular, for queries of integer range, the mechanism of [DMNS06] can be seen as computing y = f (D) and outputting z = RLap y,d/ε . We denote this (still infinite-precision, but now integer range) variant by M ), which requires n(z) = O(|z| log(d/ε)) (truly random) coins U n(z) , and increases both ε and ρ by at most a constant factor. Since we will not use the resulting (finite-precision) mechanism in this paper 2 , we state the end result without further justification. For clarity, from now we will focus on the case d = 1; however, all our results extend to any sensitivity bound d (with utility scaled by a factor of d). We will prove that accurate and private mechanisms for F 1 w.r.t. SV(γ) cannot be additive noise, answering the second question in the negative. Despite this, however, we will answer the first question positively by displaying a class M = {M ε } of accurate and private (non-additive-noise) mechanisms for F 1 w.r.t. SV(γ).
Naive Approaches and a Lower Bound
We will start by showing a few naive approaches that will explain the intuition behind why accurate and private mechanisms for F 1 w.r.t. SV(γ) cannot be additive noise. Moreover, we will prove a general lower bound restricting the type of mechanisms "friendly" to SV-sources, which will motivate a very special type of mechanisms that we will introduce in Section 4.
First Attempt. A first approach to answer our main question would be to prove that any class of accurate and private mechanisms for F 1 w.r.t. U is also accurate and private w.r.t. SV(γ). This turns out to be far too optimistic. To see this, take any mechanism M w.r.t. U, and assume that with high probability M needs at most n random coins. Define (artificial) mechanism M ′ as follows. Whenever M needs a fresh coin b i , M ′ samples k coins b i1 . . . b ik and simply sets b i = maj k (b i1 , . . . , b ik ), where maj k (·) is the majority of k bits. Clearly, M ′ has the same differential privacy and utility guarantees as M w.r.t. U, since majority of perfectly random bits is perfectly random. On the other hand, by biasing each bit towards 0 (resp. 1), a Santha-Vazirani adversary can fix each k-bit majority function to 0 (resp. 1) with probability at least (1 − e −γ 2 k/2 ), which means that he can fix all n coins of M to any desired outcome with probability at least (1 − ne −γ 2 k/2 ) ≈ 1 for k = O(log n/γ 2 ). Hence, the Santha-Vazirani adversary for M ′ can effectively fix the random tape of M , making it deterministic (with probability arbitrarily close to 1). On the other hand, it is easy to see that no deterministic mechanism having non-trivial utility (i.e., giving distinct answers on some two neighboring databases) can be differentially private.
Hence, accurate and private mechanisms w.r.t. the uniform source U are not necessarily accurate and private w.r.t. γ-Santha-Vazirani sources SV(γ).
Second
ε } is accurate and private w.r.t. SV(γ) whenever M = {M ε } is accurate and private w.r.t. U? More generally, one can define an analogous "extractor conjecture" for any imperfect source R in place of SV(γ). Unfortunately, we show that this naive approach does not work for any "non-extractable" source R, such as SV(γ). To show this, we look at the family of additive-noise mechanisms for the family F 1 of sensitivity-1 functions given by Lemma 2.11, and observe that applying an extractor to any additive-noise mechanism is still an additive-noise mechanism. Then, we show a more general statement that any accurate and private additive-noise mechanism for F 1 under R implies the existence of a bit extractor for R, which is impossible for non-extractable R, such as SV(γ). 
, which would mean that Ext ′ ε defines an ε-biased one-bit extractor for R.
General Lower Bound. The failure of our naive approaches suggests that one cannot take any accurate and private mechanism w.r.t. uniform randomness U, and apply some simple transformation to its randomness to derive an accurate and private mechanism w.r.t. SV(γ). Indeed, we will show that any accurate and private mechanism w.r.t. SV(γ) must in fact satisfy a fairly restrictive condition with respect to the uniform source. In particular, this condition (later called consistent-sampling) is never satisfied by additive-noise mechanisms.
First, we need some important notation. Consider a mechanism M with randomness space {0, 1} * , and let D ∈ D. We define the set T (D, f, z) def = {r ∈ {0, 1} n | z = M (D, f ; r)} to be the set of random coins r ∈ {0, 1} * such that M outputs z when run on database D, query f , and random coins r. We remark that since we assume that only n = n(f, z, D) coins need to be sampled to determine if M (D, f ) = z, we can assume w.l.o.g. that T (f, z, D) ⊆ {0, 1} n . In the interest of clarity, we simply write T when f, D, and z are understood from context.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the function family F is by itself non-trivial, meaning that there exist two neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 and a query f such that f (D 1 ) = f (D 2 ). We also
To show that M is (ε, R)-differentially private for F w.r.t. randomness source R, we are concerned with bounding the following ratio by 1 + ε:
As we show below, bounding the above ratio for all Santha-Vazirani sources introduces a non-trivial constraint on M . For illustration, let us first look at any additive-noise mechanism M and re-derive the conclusion of Lemma 3.1 directly.
, which means that r 1 = r 2 . Thus, T 1 ∩ T 2 = ∅. Furthermore, we can assume w.l.o.g. that |T 1 | ≥ |T 2 | since otherwise we can switch D 1 and D 2 . Using Lemma 2.4 with G = T 1 and B = T 2 , taking n = max(n(f, z, D 1 ), n(f, z, D 2 )), and using the fact that H(γ, n) ⊂ SV(γ, n), we have that there exists SV(γ) ∈ SV(γ) such that
which is the same conclusion as the one obtained in the proof of Lemma 3.1. More generally, coming back to arbitrary mechanisms, since Lemma 2.4 works even when G∩B = ∅, we get the following much stronger result. Suppose σ
This shows that a necessary condition to achieve (ε, SV(γ))-differential privacy is that σ ≤ ε/γ = O(ε). We summarize this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Assume γ > 0 and M is (ε, SV(γ))-differentially private mechanism for some class F. Fix any z ∈ Z, f ∈ F, and any neighboring databases
, and assume that
SV-Consistent Sampling
Recall that we defined T (D, f, z) def = {r ∈ {0, 1} n | z = M (D, f ; r)} to be the set of all coins r such that M outputs z when run on database D, query f and randomness r. Further recall that for neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 , we let
By Lemma 3.2 we know that in order to achieve (ε, SV(γ))-differential privacy we must have |T 2 \T 1 |/|T 2 | = O(ε). This means that as ε → 0, it must be that |T 2 \T 1 |/|T 2 | → 0. This motivates our definition of ε-consistent sampling. Later we will define ε in terms of ε such that ε → 0 as ε → 0. We remark that our definition of ε-consistent sampling is similar to the definition of [Man94, Hol07] , which has already been used in the context of differential privacy for different purposes [MMP + 10].
Definition 4.1. We say M has ε-consistent sampling ( ε-CS) if for all z ∈ Z, f ∈ F and neighboring databases
Figure 4.1: Example of how a SV(γ) ∈ SV(γ) distribution can increase the ratio
We make a few remarks about Definition 4.1. First, notice that w.l.o.g. we can assume that |T 1 | ≥ |T 2 | since in this case we have
|T 2 | . Second, notice that ε-consistent sampling also guarantees that
|T 2 | ≤ ε, which Lemma 3.2 tells us is a necessary condition for nontrivial differential privacy under SV(γ). Finally, it is easy to see that if a mechanism has ε-consistent sampling, then it is ( ε, U)-differentially private, as
To summarize, ε-consistent sampling is sufficient to achieve ( ε, U)-differential privacy and is essentially necessary to achieve (γ ε, SV(γ))-differential privacy. But is it sufficient to achieve (p( ε), SV(γ))-differential privacy for some function p such that p( ε) → 0 as ε → 0? This turns out not to be the case, as it is still possible for a Santha-Vazirani distribution to increase the probability of T 1 \T 2 while simultaneously decreasing the probability of T 2 . For instance, consider the example in Figure 4 .1, where pictorially, we view each coin r ∈ {0, 1} * as defining a path down a binary tree. In this example, T 1 \T 2 and T 2 are positioned precisely to the left and right of 1/2, respectively. After the first coin, the SV-distribution can focus on either targeting T 1 \T 2 or avoiding T 2 . If T 1 and T 2 only contain a small fraction of the leaves of this tree, then the SV distribution can greatly increase the ratio of probabilities Pr r←SV(γ) [r ∈ T 1 \T 2 ]/ Pr r←SV(γ) [r ∈ T 2 ]. This suggests that in order to handle γ-Santha Vazirani distributions, we need to make more restrictions on the mechanism.
New Observations. We make two observations that will help us guarantee that the example described in Figure 4 .1 does not arise, but we first define some notation. For m ∈ Z + and a bit sequence x = x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ {0, 1} m , we define suffix(x) def = {y = y 1 , y 2 , . . . ∈ {0, 1} * | x i = y i for all i ∈ [m]} to be the set of all bit strings that have x as a prefix. For n ∈ Z + such that m ≤ n, we define suffix(x, n) def = suffix(x) ∩ {0, 1} n . Our first observation is that if we consider the longest prefix u of all elements in T 1 ∪ T 2 , then the ratio Pr r←SV(γ) [r ∈ T 1 \T 2 ]/ Pr r←SV(γ) [r ∈ T 2 ] is the same as when the probabilities are conditioned on r having this prefix. This is because in order for r ∈ T 1 \T 2 or r ∈ T 2 , it must be the case that r ∈ suffix(u, n).
Our second observation is that we want to ensure that suffix(u, n) is a good approximation of T 1 ∪ T 2 , that is, that |suffix(u, n)| ≈ |T 1 ∪ T 2 |. This guarantees that we never encounter the problem that arose in the example in Figure 4 .1. For this to be the case, however, we must first ensure that T 1 ∪ T 2 are "close together". We therefore make the following definition.
Definition 4.2. We say M is an interval mechanism if for all queries f ∈ F, databases D ∈ D, and possible outcomes z ∈ Z, the values in T def = T (D, f, z) constitute an interval, that is, T = ∅ and the set {int(r) | r ∈ T } contains consecutive integers, where for r = r 1 . . . r n ∈ {0, 1} n , we define
We now formalize the requirement we described above. Let D 1 , D 2 be two neighboring databases, let f ∈ F, let z be a possible outcome, let n def = max(n(D 1 , f, z), n(D 2 , f, z)), and let T 1
and T 2 def = T (D 2 , f, z). We let u be the longest prefix such that T 1 ∪ T 2 ⊆ suffix(u, n). Formally,
We say that an interval mechanism M has ( ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling (( ε, c)-SVCS) if it has ε-consistent sampling and for all queries f ∈ F, all neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 ∈ D and all possible outcomes z ∈ Z, which define T 1 , T 2 , u as above, we have:
We now show that ( ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling is sufficient to obtain (ε, SV(γ))-differential privacy for an interesting value of ε, that is, for an ε that can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing ε. 
In particular, for γ ∈ [0, 1) and c = O(1), we have ε → 0 as ε → 0.
Before proving Theorem 4.4, we make a few additional definitions and prove a lemma. Let D 1 , D 2 be two neighboring databases, f ∈ F, z be a possible outcome, n = max(n(D 1 , f, z), n(D 2 , f, z)), and
• Define v to be the longest prefix such that T 1 \T 2 ⊆ suffix(v, n). Formally,
That is, I 0 ∪ I 1 = T 1 \T 2 and I b contains all coins in T 1 \T 2 that have vb as prefix.
-Define v 0 to be the longest prefix such that I 0 ⊆ suffix(v 0 , n). Formally,
-Define v 1 to be the longest prefix such that I 1 ⊆ suffix(v 1 , n). Formally,
, n)} • Define w to be a shortest prefix such that suffix(w, n) ⊆ T 2 . Formally,
We remark that w may not be unique. In this case, any of the (at most two) possible values is just as good since we will be concerned with the value |w| which is the same across all possible values of w.
See Figure 4 .2 for a pictorial representation of u, v, w. Note the asymmetry of the definitions of u, v, and w. Also note that we define v and w in such a way that suffix(v) ∩ suffix(w) = ∅. Informally, max(|v 0 |, |v 1 |) − |w| is roughly the number of coins that the Santha-Vazirani distribution needs to use to increase the probability of landing in T 1 \T 2 without affecting the probability of landing in T 2 , while |w|−|u| is roughly the number of coins that it can use to decrease the probability of landing in T 2 without affecting the probability of landing in T 1 \T 2 . We first prove a lemma that says that if M has ( ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling then max(|v 0 |, |v 1 |) − |w| = Ω(log(1/ ε)) and |w| − |u| = O(log c). Proof. By ( ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling we know that
We therefore have,
Reorganizing yields the first inequality. We also have,
Reorganizing yields the second inequality.
We now prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4:
Fix z ∈ Z, f ∈ F, and neighboring databases
So we need only prove that
By the total probability theorem,
By our definition of v and w, we have
Assume, without loss of generality, that |v 0 | ≤ |v 1 |. By the definition of a Santha-Vazirani source and the fact that we are conditioning on r ∈ suffix(u),
where we used Lemma 4.5 in the second inequality.
Accurate and Private SVCS Mechanisms for Bounded Sensitivity Functions
In this section we show a mechanism, which we denote M SVCS e ε , that achieves ( ε, O(1))-SVCS for F dthe class of functions with bounded sensitivity d ∈ Z + . By Theorem 4.4 this gives us a (ε, SV(γ))-differentially private mechanism, where ε → 0 as ε → 0. Furthermore, by our observation in Section 4, the mechanism is also ( ε, U)-differentially private. We highlight that for convenience, we parametrize the mechanism M SVCS e ε with the privacy parameter ε w.r.t. U, and state the privacy and utility guarantees w.r.t. SV(γ) as a function of ε (see Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2). For clarity, we focus on the case d = 1.
We start with the ( ε, U)-differentially private mechanism of Dwork et.al. [DMNS06] , M RLap e ε (D, f ) = f (D) + RLap 0,1/e ε . Note that since M RLap e ε is additive-noise, then any finite-precision implementation will also be additive-noise, and by Lemma 3.1 we know it cannot be accurate and private for F 1 w.r.t. SV(γ). This is because the set of random coins that make the mechanism output z ∈ Z on two neighboring databases is disjoint. We will therefore need to make several changes to ensure not only that these sets overlap, but that their intersection is large, thus ensuring ε-consistent sampling. Moreover, we must carefully implement our mechanism with finite precision so that the resulting mechanism is ( ε, O(1))-SV-consistent, ensuring that pathological cases, such as the one in Figure 4 .1, do not occur. Finally, in performing all these changes we must also keep in mind that we want a good bound on utility. We first describe a new infinite-precision mechanism, which we call M SVCS is not additive-noise, since the rounding ensures that the "noise" introduced is dependent on y = f (D). Further, the output distribution is only defined on multiples of 1/ ε, i.e. for k/ ε where k ∈ Z.
Consistent Sampling. We now give some intuition as to why this mechanism already satisfies ε-consistent sampling. Since we are considering only queries in F 1 , for any two neighboring databases Notice that both the intervals defined in the numerator and denominator have size 1/ ε, and that the interval in the denominator is simply the interval in the numerator, shifted by 1. Therefore, their intersection is roughly a 1 − ε fraction of their size, which is precisely what is required by ε-consistent sampling. Of course, we now need to implement this ε-consistent mechanism with finite precision, so as to achieve the stronger form of ( ε, O(1))-SV-consistency. For that, we will use arithmetic coding and some specific properties of the Laplace distribution.
From Infinite to Finite Precision via Arithmetic Coding.
In what follows, we use the following notation: for a sequence r = r 1 , r 2 , . . . ∈ {0, 1} * , we define its real representation to be the real number
Arithmetic coding gives us a way to approximate any distribution X on Z from a bit string r ∈ {0, 1} * , as follows. Let CDF X be the cumulative distribution of X, so that
. Then the set of points {s(x)} x∈Z partitions the interval [0, 1] into infinitely many intervals {I X (x) def = [s(x − 1), s(x))} x∈Z , where X(x) = |I X (x)|. Note that if a value x ∈ Z has zero probability, then we can simply ignore it as its corresponding interval will be empty. We can obtain distribution X from U by sampling a sequence of bits r = r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , . . . and outputting the unique x ∈ Z such that real(r) ∈ I X (x). Note that arithmetic coding has the very nice property that intervals I X (x) and I X (x + 1) are always consecutive for any x ∈ Z.
Since for some x ∈ Z we can have that s(x) has an infinite binary decimal representation, there is no a priori bound on the number of coins to decide whether real(r) ∈ I X (x) or real(r) ∈ I X (x + 1). To avoid this, we simply round each endpoint s(x) to its most n = n(x) significant figures, for some n = n(x) > 1 which potentially depends on x. We will need to make sure that n(x) is legal, in the sense that rounding with respect to n(x) should not cause intervals to "disappear" or for consecutive intervals to "overlap". We use a bar to denote rounded values: s(x) for the rounded endpoint, and I X (x) for the rounded interval [s(x − 1), s(x)).
A New Finite Precision Mechanism. We now show how to sample Z y , the output distribution of M SVCS e ε (D, f ) using arithmetic coding. This yields a new finite precision mechanism, which we call
, and let Z y be its output distribution which will approximate Z y . The distribution Z y is the Laplacian distribution Lap y,1/e ε where for all k ∈ Z, the probability mass in the interval into infinitely many intervals
We obtain distribution Z y from U by sampling a sequence of bits r ∈ {0, 1} * and outputting k/ ε where k ∈ Z is the unique integer such that real(r) ∈ I y (k). We have not yet defined what the precision n = n(y, k) is; we will do this below, but first we give some intuition as to why M SVCS e ε will satisfy ( ε, O(1))-SV-consistent sampling for some "good-enough" precision.
SV-Consistent Sampling. Recall that since we assume f ∈ F 1 , for any two neighboring databases
We thus wish to prove that the mechanism has ( ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling where T 1 = I y (k) ≈ I y (k) and T 2 = I y−1 (k) ≈ I y−1 (k) in Definition 4.3. For now, let us assume that we use arithmetic coding with infinite precision, that is, we do not round the endpoints. We will give intuition as to why our mechanism satisfies an "infinite-precision analogue" of SV-consistent sampling. We can define u to be the longest prefix of all coins in I def = I y (k)∪I y−1 (k), and let u ℓ def = u, 0, 0, . . . and u r def = u, 1, 1, . . .. Informally, u is the longest prefix such that u ℓ is to the left of I and u r is to the right of I. Then an "infinite-precision analogue" of (·, O(1))-SV-consistent sampling is the following:
By construction, we have real(u r ) − real(u ℓ ) ≈ 2 −|u| . Furthermore, our rounding ensures that I y (k)∩I y−1 (k) = ∅; indeed, we can view I y−1 (k) as having "shifted" I y (k) slightly to the right. We can therefore view I = I y (k) ∪ I y−1 (k) as one single interval that is slightly bigger. Moreover, arithmetic coding and our use of the Laplacian distribution ensures that smaller intervals are farther from the center than bigger ones, and in fact, the size of the interval that contains I and everything to its right (or left, depending on whether I is to the right or left of 1/2, respectively) is a constant factor of |I|. This means that |I y (k) ∪ I y−1 (k)| = |I| = c · 2 −|u| for a constant c, and we thus obtain the ratio required in Equation (5.1).
Defining the Precision. Now we just need to round all the points s y (k) with enough precision so that the rounding is "legal" (i.e., preserves the relative sizes of all intervals I y (k) and I y (k)\I y−1 (k) to within a constant factor), so that our informal analysis of SV-consistency above still holds after the rounding. Formally, we let I ′ y (k) def = I y (k)\I y−1 (k), be the interval containing the coins that will make the mechanism output k/ ε when it is run on D 1 but output (k − 1)/ ε when run on D 2 . We then let
and round s y (k) to its max(n(y+1, k+1), n(y, k+1)) most significant figures. The resulting mechanism M SVCS e ε in shown in Figure 5 .1.
We can now state our main results about SV-consistency and SV-privacy of our mechanism:
Lemma 5.1. Mechanism M Utility. We have showed that our mechanism M SVCS e ε achieves ( ε, O(1))-SV-consistent sampling and thus (ε, SV(γ))-differential privacy, where ε → 0 as ε → 0. We now argue that the mechanism also has non-trivial utility. It is easy to see that when the randomness source is uniform, rounding to the nearest multiple of 1/ ε only affects utility by an additive factor of 1/ ε, thus maintaining (O(1/ ε), U)-utility. This is comparable to the utility of the mechanism M To analyze utility w.r.t. SV(γ), we first bound the probability that a coin sampled from a γ-Santha-Vazirani distribution r ← SV(γ), lands in the interval I y (k), since this is the probability that M SVCS e ε outputs k/ ε when the real answer is y = f (D). We consider the longest common prefix a of all coins in I y (k) and upper bound the probability of landing in I y (k) by the probability that r has a as prefix. We can then upper bound this probability by • Let n(y, k) = n(D, f, z) def = log 1 |I ′ y (k)| + 3 and let r ′ y,k be the n(y, k) most significant figures of r.
• Output the the unique z = k/ ε such that 
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
In Section 5, we gave some intuition to argue that the infinite precision mechanism M SVCS e ε has ε-consistent sampling. Here we will prove formally that this is indeed the case (modulo a constant factor). Recall that we define s y (k)
Proof. We must consider four cases:
2(e−1) .
If s
For ε ∈ (0, 1), we have 1 − e −e ε 2(e − 1) < 1 − e −e ε e − 1 < e e ε+1 − e e − 1 < 2(e e ε+1 − e) e − 1 < 6 ε .
We now prove that the finite-precision mechanism M SVCS e ε has O( ε)-consistent sampling, as defined in Definition 4.1. Recall that we round the endpoints of s y (k − 1) and s y−1 (k − 1) of the interval I ′ y (k) to its n def = max(n(y, k), n(y − 1, k)) most significant figures, where n(y, k) def = log 1 |I ′ y (k)| + 1. Further recall that for O( ε)-consistent sampling, we wish to prove that the number of n-bit strings in I ′ y (k) is an O( ε) fraction of the number of coins in I y−1 (k). We thus define the following notation. For an interval I = [a, b) ⊂ [0, 1], we let str(I, n) def = {r ∈ {0, 1} n | real(r) ∈ I} be the set of all n-bit strings whose real representation lies in I. As an intermediate step towards proving O( ε)-consistent sampling, we show that T 1 \T 2 = str(I ′ y (k), n) has constant size, and T 2 = str(I y−1 (k), n) has size Ω(1/ ε).
We begin by showing that rounding the endpoints as described, does not alter the size of the intervals I ′ y (k) or I y−1 (k) by much.
Lemma A.2. For all y, k ∈ Z and n = max(n(y, k), n(y − 1, k)), we have Proof. Since each endpoint changes by at most 2 −n /2, then rounding changes the size of the interval by at most 2 −n .
Let n = max(n(y, k), n(y − 1, k)). The following lemma says that the number of n-bit strings inside I ′ y (k) is constant, while the number of n-bit strings inside I y−1 (k) is at least a constant factor of 1/ ε. Since for consistent sampling we're interesting in rounding the ratio between the number of n-bit strings in I ′ y (k) and I y−1 (k), this will yield O( ε)-consistent sampling.
Lemma A.3. For all y, k ∈ Z and n = max(n(y, k), n(y − 1, k)), we have, |str(I ′ y (k), n)| ≤ 9 and |str(I y−1 (k), n)| ≥ 1 3 ε
Proof. We can see |I ′ y (k)| as the probability of sampling a sequence r from U n such that r ∈ str(I ′ y (k), n). Therefore, has 27 ε-consistent sampling. We now show that in fact, it has (27 ε, c)-SV-consistent sampling for c = O(1).
Proof of Lemma 5.1: By Lemma A.3, we know that |T 1 ∪ T 2 | ≥ |T 2 | = |str(I y−1 (k), n)| ≥ 1/3 ε. It thus suffices to prove that |suffix(u, n)| = O(1/ ε), where u is the longest common prefix of all strings in I def = I y (k) ∪ I y−1 (k). Let u be the longest common prefix of all strings in I def = I y (k) ∪ I y−1 (k). By rounding we must have that |suffix(u, n)| ≤ |suffix(u, n)| + 2. Moreover, we can bound |suffix(u, n)| by bounding the number of n-bit strings to the left or right of I (depending on where I y (k) and I y−1 (k) are located in the interval [0, 1]).
Recall that I ′ y (k) = [s y (k − 1), s y−1 (k − 1)) and I y−1 (k) = [s y−1 (k − 1), s y−1 (k − 1)). We first calculate the size of the interval [s y (k), 1] (resp. [0, s y−1 (k)]), that is, the interval taking all values to the left (resp. to the right) and including I. This will give us a good approximation of the size of [s y (k), 1] (resp. [0, s y−1 (k)]). From this we can calculate how many n-bit strings there are to left or right of I. We have to consider four cases: At the same time, |J| is the probability of sampling a sequence r from U n such that r ∈ str(J, n). 
